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“VALUE ENGINEERING…?” – CHANGES DURING CONSTRUCTION
Maral Papazian Bedian, P.E.
PERINI Corporation, Civil Construction
Peekskill, New York, USA

ABSTRACT
“Value Engineering” is a frequently found clause in Construction contracts in the USA, allowing contractor-initiated design changes.
Misleading is the interpretation of “value engineering” to imply cost savings shared with the owner, and its implementation during
construction, is problematic. It is not surprising that such a clause would simply be ignored because it involves changes in design,
often major changes in very short time; and change is feared and vehemently resisted by all parties, owner, designer, and contractor.
The problem may lie in the divergence and separation of the designer/engineer and builder/contractor; their priorities and incentives
are very different. The engineer spends years, even decades, in design and prepares contract documents often without a deep-seated
understanding of construction methods, including geotechnical construction. Even worse, given extensive computational
advancements, the designer submits exaggerated code-based designs with excessive safety factors. As for the contractor, he often
builds without full appreciation of design principles or regard for design engineers. Owner budget and schedule constraints (not
commensurate with his demands) and the ever-increasing litigious climate have exacerbated the situation. Adverse and hostile
relationship between the various groups is often the norm with extended disputes and claims, not to mention the costs these entail.
Redesign to apply a new technology or optimization of an inferior design just before construction becomes unthinkable. Four case
histories are presented.

INTRODUCTION
Four case histories (spanning from 1998 to 2002) are
presented, where major design changes were implemented in
record speed during construction of several very large projects
in the metropolitan New York area. They include, two
Design/Build projects: Case History 1) the redesign of large
diameter drilled shafts for the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail
Transit System ($1.1 billion total value and $343 million for
the Initial Operating Segment for this case); Case History 2)
the elimination of deep caissons in favor of spread footings for
a new $90 million MTA bus depot in Manhattan; and, two
conventional Design/Bid/Build projects: Case History 3)
maintaining in lieu of removal of a 100-year old abutment of
the $72 million Queens Boulevard Bridge Replacement; Case
History 4) the complete redesign of major retaining walls and
actual use, for the first time outside Asia, of the “Giken”
tubular pressed-in pipe piles as very high cantilever retaining
walls, for the $150 million expansion of the Long Island
Expressway.
Before describing the four case histories, it is noted that
projects of such large magnitude involve armies of people
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with different backgrounds. For many, their basis of
experience in design and/or construction is largely to follow
codes and specifications and paper tracking has become the
occupation for many more. Most of the parties involved in
large projects do not feel the need nor have the incentive to
consider cost-effective solutions. Often, they are not even
aware that changes are necessary or possible. Moreover, in a
litigious society such as in the USA, liability concerns impede
innovation, much less implementing design changes once
construction has begun. In their attempt to be “safe”, many do
not advocate or employ the very advances that are presented
and discussed in journal articles and conferences. Owner
budget constraints — not commensurate with his demands —
and fast-track schedules — often unrealistic — have
exacerbated the situation.
It is perhaps helpful to mention that the “valuable
engineering” design changes for the cases described herein are
the personal account of a geotechnical engineer “defecting” to
the construction side (where a possibility for adequate change
could be detected), combined with the least welcome attitude
of a female passion and insistence. The process of change was
unconventional, painful, and even comical.
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CASE HISTORY 1 – Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System, New Jersey:
“Redesign of Newport Viaduct Drilled Shaft Foundations”

The Project
The Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System is a 33 Km
Design-Build-Operate-Maintain light rail project in northern
New Jersey. The Initial 16 Km of the project extends through
Jersey City and includes a 0.8 Km long viaduct, a multiplespan bridge carrying the light rail in a north-south direction
just west of the Hudson River. Near the mid-length, the bridge
crosses over the entrance to Holland Tunnel leading to
Manhattan, New York.
For the multi-span Newport viaduct, deep foundations
including drilled shafts (bored piles) were selected with loads
ranging from 4,450 KN to 16,300 KN (500 to 1,800 tons)
from each pier. (In general, the design/build team followed the
original bid reference documents including project design
criteria, as well as mandated codes and specifications.) The
initial design required the drilled shafts to extend through a
thick zone of “completely weathered rock” and then be

socketed into “sound” sandstone. The assigned design
parameters were generally consistent with the bid reference
documents, a unit end bearing resistance for rock of 0.8 MPa
(8 tsf), increased to 1.2 MPa (12 tsf) after minimum 3 m
penetration into “sound” bedrock. For “sound” rock, an
allowable unit shaft resistance of 275 KPa (2.9 tsf) was
specified.
The subsurface conditions along the bridge alignment consist
of an upper 6 m thick granular fill over 3 m soft marine clay,
underlain by 12 m of medium dense to very dense glacial
deposits comprised of alternating layers of silty sands with
gravel to clayey silts. Weathered sandstone, with an average
thickness of about 7 m and described in the test boring logs as
“completely weathered rock”, extends below the glacial
deposits with SPT-N values of 100 blows for only 25 mm to
150 mm penetration. Sandstone bedrock exists below a depth
of about 28 m. The groundwater table at this site is shallow
and within 3 m of the existing ground surface (Fig. 1.1).

Fig 1.1. Typical Subsurface Section with Drilled Shafts
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The Change
The initial design for the drilled shaft foundations supporting
the viaduct was questioned by this author, given the highly
variable nature of the sandstone rock and the implications of
searching for “sound” sandstone at great depths. Encouraged
by recent studies of intermediate geomaterials (O’Neill et al.,
1996), it was deemed unnecessarily conservative to bypass the
weathered sandstone in search of deeper “sound” rock. Also, a
report (Baker, 1988) on foundations for an adjacent 30-story
office tower supported on 1.2 m diameter drilled shafts in the
“completely weathered rock” zone showed resistances that
were substantially higher than what was specified for “sound”
rock. The report contained two conventional head-down static
loading tests that measured unit toe resistance ranging from
7.8 MPa (80 tsf) @ 35 mm movement, to 10.4 MPa (108 tsf)
@ 15 mm movement. The higher unit toe resistance was
measured in the upper parts of the weathered layer having SPT
N-indices of 100 for only 150 mm penetration. From the same
loading tests, a unit shaft resistance of 2.2 MPa (23 tsf) had
been deduced for the weathered material.
With the above and other design information at hand, the
initial simplistic design was rejected and higher design values
for the weathered rock were implemented subject to
verification in full-scale static loading tests. The intent of the
testing was to demonstrate that the drilled shafts can be
supported on top of or just within the “Weathered Sandstone”,
believed to provide adequate shaft and toe resistances to
support the bridge column loads. More important, the testing
was also intended to evaluate the impact of the proposed
construction procedures on the axial capacity of the drilled
shafts. Because of the large design loads, the Osterberg-cell
(O-cell) test method was selected.

In summary, the testing is conducted from bottom up with the
use of a sacrificial hydraulic jack — i.e. the Osterberg Cell,
placed near the base of the shaft to be tested. As the O-cell
expands, it pushes the shaft upward and the base downward.
Unlike the classic head-down static loading test, the O-cell
allows the separate measurements of load-movement behavior
of the shaft and the base. The upward load movement is
governed by the shear resistance characteristics of the soil or
rock along the shaft, whereas the downward load movement is
governed by the compressibility of the soil or rock below the
shaft toe (Fellenius et al., 1999).
For this project, the O-cell loading test was conducted on one
of the central (2.15 m in diameter) drilled shafts, which was
prepared as a production caisson. The subsurface profile at the
test location, as determined from a nearby test boring and as
observed from the drill cuttings, consisted of 4.6 m thick
granular fill, over 5.5 m marine clay, underlain by 10.8 m
glacial deposits of silty sands with gravel. What had been
described in a nearby boring as “completely weathered rock”
at about 21 m depth below the existing grade, was recovered
as a 1 m diameter solid sandstone core (Photo 1.1),
immediately underlain by soil-like, completely weathered
rock. The test shaft was advanced about 3 m into the
weathered sandstone. The total length of the test shaft was
about 24 m below the ground surface.

It is perhaps not a surprise that the above change was strongly
resisted by all parties involved, including the designers, whose
“safe” design in “sound” rock was challenged. What was not
anticipated, at least by the author, was the drilled-shaft
subcontractor’s reluctance to accept “reduced drilling
quantities”. The first loading test with the O-cell was not
successful because of premature mobilization of shaft
resistance caused by excessive drilling disturbances. However,
after making all the necessary adjustments/refinement in the
construction procedures, the second loading test, which
immediately followed, achieved the intended “valuable”
engineering change, as described below.

Testing Program
Principles of the O-cell method can be found elsewhere
(Osterberg, 1994; Schmertmann, 1997; Fellenius, 2001).
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Photo 1.1 - Recovered 1m diameter Core from the
“Completely Weathered Rock” zone
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The test shaft (as well as all the remaining 44 production
shafts with diameters ranging from 2.15 m to 2.75 m) was
constructed using the slurry method to maintain a stable hole.
Drilling began with soil augers to 1.5 m depth before
introducing the polymer slurry, followed by further drilling
and installing a slightly oversized 10 m long temporary casing
to support the upper fill and marine clay. Both soil and rock
augers were used to advance the shaft below the temporary
casing and through the glacial soils. The slurry level inside the
shaft was maintained approximately 1.5 m above the outside
groundwater level, just below the existing ground surface.
Once weathered rock was reached, a permanent steel casing
(Photo 1.2) with welded teeth was inserted into the shaft and
twisted for about 0.3 m into the weathered sandstone. Drilling
below the permanent casing was then continued at slightly
reduced 2 m diameter using rock augers, sometimes assisted
with core barrels to core the harder rock. For the test shaft, the
length of the socket extending into the weathered sandstone
was 2.5 m. The sides of the socket were scraped to remove
softened material. At the end of drilling, the bottom of the
socket was cleared of cuttings and accumulated sediments
were removed using a clean-out bucket. It was estimated that
approximately 25 mm of sediments remained at the base of the
test shaft before beginning the O-cell static loading test.

Following drilling and clean-out of the test shaft, three 533
mm (21 inch) diameter sacrificial O-cells (welded and
contained between two circular steel plates, and mounted on a
steel frame), were lowered to the bottom of the test shaft
(Photos 1.3 and 1.4).

Photo 1.3. – Three O-Cells between two steel plates

Photo 1.4. – The O-Cell assembly, complete with
Instrumentation being lowered to the bottom of the prepared
Drilled Shaft (before concreting)

Photo 1.2. – Installation of Permanent Steel Casing
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The three O-cells were capable of applying a total combined
load of 34,200 KN (3,845 tons). The O-cell assembly was
complete with instrumentation including sister bar vibrating
wire strain gages at three levels along the shaft, to measure the
shaft resistance (side shear load transfer) in the various layers.
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Once the O-cell assembly was positioned inside the test shaft,
concrete placement by pumping from the bottom up
proceeded, until the level reached to within 2.2 m below the
final head level. (The upper 2.2 m part of the shaft was later
reinforced and concreted monolithic with the bridge pier. It is
noted that the design optimization had also eliminated the use
of full-length reinforcing cages; instead, the drilled shafts
consisted of 16 mm thick permanent steel casing filled with
34.5 MPa (5,000 psi) concrete, and a steel reinforcement cage
limited to the upper 2.2 m part of the shaft.)
Following placement of the concrete, the annulus between the
outer temporary casing and the inner permanent casing in the
top 10 m of the shaft was grouted via a tremie pipe and the

temporary casing was gradually pulled as grout filled the void
that was created during drilling.
The O-cell static loading test was performed by Loadtest Inc.,
on December 21, 1998, five days after placement of the shaft
concrete and its attainment of the necessary compressive
strength. The quick loading test procedure was followed and
readings of all gages were obtained at 1, 2 and 4 minutes for
each of the 14 loading increments. The three O-cells were
pressurized to a total test load of 20,600 KN (2,315 tons) (half
upward and half downward). The loading was halted when it
was determined that the side shear in the overburden soils
surrounding the permanent casing was approaching its full
resistance mobilization.

Results

Based on the results of the O-cell static loading test, the total
upward movement of the shaft was 4.6 mm at a maximum
upward net load (gross load minus the buoyant weight of the
shaft) of 9,300 KN (1,040 tons). The total downward
movement of the shaft base at the maximum downward gross
load (net load plus buoyant weight of shaft) of 10,300 KN
(1160 tons) was 4.5 mm. This movement is only 0.2% of the
shaft socket base diameter of 2 meter. Because of such small
base movement and no apparent creep, it can be concluded
that the ultimate end-bearing resistance of the shaft founded in
the “completely weathered sandstone” was never reached.
The interpreted average unit bearing resistance in the
weathered sandstone at the measured nominal 4.5 mm
movement was 3.35 MPa (35 tsf). While not approaching its
anticipated ultimate capacity, this deduced unit bearing
resistance in the “completely weathered rock” was much
higher than the bid design value, of 0.8 MPa to 1.2 MPa (8 to
12 tsf), specified for “sound” rock.
It is further noted that the unit shaft resistances measured
during the loading with the O-cells, were lower than measured
for the previously described conventional head-down static
loading tests at the nearby office tower. This could be due to
that, in a conventional head-down test the instrumentation will
not measure the load locked-in the pile (residual load) before
the start of the test. When the residual load is neglected, the
shaft resistance is overestimated. The use of polymer slurry
and running the test only five days after drilling and
concreting could also have resulted in a lower range of shaft
resistance values.
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Table 1 below summarizes the results of the Side Shear
Transfer data for the various subsurface layers along the test
shaft from the strain gage instrumentation.

Table 1. Side Shear Transfer from O-Cell Strain Gage Data
Load Transfer Zone

Grouted Zone outside
Permanent Casing
(upper ~ 9.3 m of
overburden soils)
Non-Grouted Zone
outside Permanent Casing
(~11.6 m glacial soils;
drilled under slurry)
Upper ~1.7 m Socket in
Weathered Sandstone
(includes 0.3m casing
embedded into W.S.)
Lower ~ 1.1 m Socket in
Weathered Sandstone

Unit Side Shear
Resistance

30 KPa

(0.31 tsf)

6 KPa

(0.07 tsf)

333 KPa

(3.48 tsf)

302 KPa

(3.16 tsf)
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Figure 1.2, below, shows the Load vs. Movement curves, separately, for each of the upward and downward movement directions.

Load (KN)

Movement (mm)

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

12,000

SHAFT

Upward

Downward

TOE

Fig. 1.2 –Load-Movement Curves from O-Cell Test Results

Conclusion
Despite the strong resistance to change by the parties
involved, the main objective of demonstrating that the
“Weathered Sandstone” should not be bypassed in search of
“Sound” rock was achieved. The Newport Viaduct is now
supported on large diameter drilled shafts with only nominal
1.5 m penetration or “sockets” in the “completely weathered
rock” material.

The unnecessary search for “sound” sandstone at great depths
was eliminated, together with unavoidable disputes and
delays. In addition to considerable time and cost savings, the
design change contributed to some valuable insight and
experience in design and construction of large diameter drilled
shafts in northern New Jersey.
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CASE HISTORY 2. – 100th Street Bus Depot, New York City:
“Elimination of Deep Caissons in Favor of Spread Footings”

The Project
The 100th Street Bus Depot is a new five-story bus terminal for
the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)
occupying one city block in Manhattan between 99th and 100th
Streets, and between Lexington and Park Avenues. It replaces
a former two-story garage, built in the 1890’s and initially
used as a trolley-car barn. The new structure is a steel-framed
building with concrete floors and includes a partial basement
near its middle. The easternmost column line with design
loads of 10 MN (1,125 tons) is within 1.5 m of the underlying
multi-tube Lexington Avenue subway system.
To support the new columns along the subway line, the project
bid plans had called for 1 m diameter and 17 m deep caissons.

The upper 14 m of each caisson unit would have required
50 mm isolation from the surrounding rock thus transferring
the column loads to below the base of the existing tunnel, via
3 m long sockets in bedrock. (This follows a routine
requirement by MTA to prevent stress from being imposed on
the roof and walls of their tunnels.)
The bid documents contained extensive test boring
information, which revealed that the project site was underlain
by massive Manhattan mica Schist bedrock within just 3 m
below street level. In fact, the Lexington Avenue two-level
and multi-tube subway had been tunneled through this rock
circa 1910, leaving an about 6 m thick solid rock roof over the
upper-level subway (Fig. 2). The NX rock core recovery
values were near 100 % with an average RQD of 75 %.

Fig. 2 – Typical Subsurface Section at Bus Depot
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The Change

The Bus Depot project was let as a design/build contract with
a very aggressive fast-track schedule. Both the pre-bid
preliminary design and the subsequent final design by the
Contractor’s own hired design engineers relied heavily on
very restrictive codes, including unnecessarily conservative
approaches to seismic design. Any suggestion for value
engineering change was undesirable and was strongly resisted.
Yet, objecting to the blind reliance on codes in foundation
design, the author questioned the real need for the deep
caissons to support the columns along the subway. The
unsupported statement that no stresses from the new structure
can be imposed on the roof and walls of the adjacent tunnel
was not sufficient reason for a deep foundation design.
Unconvinced that deep shafts were necessary, the author
rushed to MTA’s warehouse where many rows of the project
rock core boxes were neatly stacked. Careful inspection and
some simple testing of the rock cores with the blows of a
geologic hammer gave support to the reservations about the
design. Later, as expected, the schist bedrock at this site was
found to be hard to very hard with unconfined compressive
strength values estimated to range from at least 70 MPa to
over 100 MPa (10,000 psi to 15,000 psi). The tensile strength
of the rock was assessed to be minimum 5 MPa (750 psi).
It may be necessary to mention here that prior to the bid, more
than 40 deep test borings including extensive coring of the
rock had been carried out. However, not a single test was
conducted on the cores to determine the strength of the rock. It
is discouraging to realize that in this and in many other
projects, test borings are performed to simply satisfy code
requirements. Then, the boring logs become just part of the
bid package for the contractor to review and, in essence, to
become responsible and liable for the subsurface conditions
encountered. It is further noted that contract specifications
including this project, often demand requirements such as “no
damage”, “no movement” or “no vibration”, thereby shifting
all liability of underground work onto the contractor.
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It is not surprising that such shifting of liability has resulted in
unwarranted contingency for the contractor and is a source of
claims and disputes. The need for careful evaluation of all
aspects of a project, from inception to construction
completion,
including
the
very
often-neglected
structure/foundation interaction could perhaps alleviate some
pain during construction, where the real test for any design
begins.
Results
Convinced that deep foundations were not warranted for the
100th Street Bus Depot because good hard rock was so
shallow, the fight for using shallow footings instead, began. At
the pre-construction meeting, the author rolled a sample of the
drilled rock core onto the conference table to show the more
than 25 attendees what actually lay beneath the surface. An
unrelenting argument was presented, dramatizing the nominal
stresses on the roof and walls of the tunnel induced by shallow
spread footings supported only on top of bedrock, as opposed
to the substantial stresses caused due to drilling of the
specified deep shafts so very near the tunnel (Fig. 2). To
overcome the tensile strength and actually cut the hard rock,
by drilling or coring, large axial forces and a substantial torque
from the drilling machine would be required, it was argued.
These drilling induced stresses immediately adjacent to the
tunnel would be at least ten times larger than the maximum
stresses induced from a shallow spread footing, under extreme
loading condition, including the code-based unrealistically
large seismic loads. It was, therefore, clear that the strict
limitations imposed by the bid regarding impact on the
adjacent tunnel were not realistic, nor were they consistent.
Conclusion
Eventually, the deep caissons were eliminated and shallow
spread footings on top of the mica schist bedrock were used to
support the columns of the new structure.
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CASE HISTORY 3 – Reconstruction of Queens Boulevard Bridge, New York:
“Saving the100-year old South Abutment”

The Project
The reconstruction of the 100-year old Queens Boulevard
Bridge (QBB) for the New York City Department of
Transportation was let as a conventional design-bid-build
contract with a very aggressive schedule. The QBB is a major
bridge crossing Sunnyside railroad yard where an extensive
network of railway tracks is in constant use. Immediately
above the QBB runs the New York City Transit Authority
“elevated subway” line, leading to the underground subway
system in Manhattan. The QBB itself is situated in one of the
most congested areas of Queens, NY. This, combined with an
active railway system 7 m below the bridge, and an active
train system less than 9 m above the bridge, can make any

construction activity in the middle a very difficult task. These
physical constraints are further complicated because different
agencies own and operate the various infrastructures.
The contract bid plans had specified the complete removal and
replacement of the bridge superstructure and the complete
removal and replacement of only one of the abutments, the
South Abutment. The foundations of all the existing 18
intermediate piers and the north abutment were to be
maintained.
The existing south abutment is a 30 m long concrete gravity
structure with shallow spread footing (Fig. 3a). The north
abutment and the intermediate piers are supported on timber
piles.

Fig. 3a – Typical Section at South Abutment of Queens Boulevard Bridge
The contract had called for replacing the existing south
abutment with a new reinforced concrete structure, supported
on deep concrete-filled steel pipe piles. For removal and
replacement of the existing abutment, the bid plans had
specified an excavation support system comprised of soldier
piles / lagging, with tiebacks. This excavation support system
was in very close proximity to the deep foundations of the
existing overhead “elevated subway” bents, built circa 1915.
The subsurface conditions at the 100-year old railroad yard
within which all the foundations of QBB are founded, are
comprised of an upper 8 m thick silty sand fill, overlying a 1.5
m thin layer of organic clayey silt with peat, over 15 m thick
dense glacial deposits of silty sands and gravel, over schist
bedrock (Fig. 3b).
Fig. 3b – Typical Subsurface Profile at the South Abutment

Paper No. 11.01

9

The Change

Upon award of the construction contract, finding the reason
behind the complete removal and replacement of only one of
the twenty supporting elements of the new lighter
superstructure of the QBB began. The complexity of the site
and the very real potential for conflicts between such closely
situated structures administered by so many different agencies
provided ample reason to question the bid design. Indeed,
except for one obvious crack, which was easily repairable,
there did not appear to be much justification for the complete
removal of the south abutment.
Value engineering to maintain this gravity abutment with its
shallow spread footing (in lieu of a new pile supported
structure) was initiated, but it received an unbelievably fierce
resistance. Unfortunately, this is an only too-common reaction
whenever spread footings in lieu of deep foundations are
proposed. Very often, deep foundations are selected without
proper evaluation of constructability or impact due to
construction. In many situations, shallow footings perform as
well, if not better than deep foundations, yet they are
consistently ignored. More recently, the excuse of “seismic
consideration” is immediately presented without real
understanding or evaluation of dynamic behavior.
Despite the obstacles, however, saving the historic structure
became a personal mission for the author. Extensive
settlement, and static, dynamic, and liquefaction analyses were
performed in support of maintaining it.

Results
The record drawings of the existing South Abutment
contained a valuable note indicating that the massive concrete
gravity structure had experienced about 75 mm settlement
during construction from May 1909 to October 1910. This was
not unusual, because the abutment is underlain by a sandy fill
layer, which probably was in a loose state some 100 years ago.
(It is likely that the subsequent use of timber piles to support
the remaining piers and the north abutment was a result of the
observed movement.)
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Since the bridge (including the south abutment) had remained
in successful service for over 90 years, further settlements, if
any must have been small. The probable cause for the 10 mm
wide vertical crack in the abutment was differential settlement
resulting from consolidation of the thin organic layer below
the fill. However, after nearly 100 years, the structure had
reached a complete state of equilibrium. Furthermore,
because the new loads from the replacement superstructure
would be lighter than the one removed, no further settlements
were to be anticipated. It is noted that the net bearing stress
on the foundation soils imposed by the existing or the new
bridge do not exceed a nominal 100 KPa (1 tsf).
The seismic analysis of the abutment proved to be very
contentious. Efforts were not spared by the parties involved to
impede the consistent conclusion that the existing abutment
had adequate dynamic resistance. Even with unrealistic peak
ground acceleration, and excessive seismic loads used in the
extensive analyses (much higher than that assumed for the
other elements of the same bridge), the dynamic performance
of the abutment was still more than adequate.
The “drama” of soil liquefaction and the suggestion that 1.2 m
settlements would occur due to liquefaction, was even more
unrealistic. Response analysis revealed that such settlements,
if any would not exceed 25 mm under a “fictitious”
Magnitude 6.5 Earthquake in Queens, New York. Ironically,
the “elevated subway” bents above the subject abutment
cannot withstand an earthquake magnitude of 5.0 or 5.5,
typically assumed for this site.
Moreover, the original bid design involving abutment removal
had easily overlooked potential movements inherent with deep
excavation and tieback installation, not to mention the
vibrations from driving new piles, so near the vulnerable
existing structures.

Conclusion
Needless to say, the South Abutment of the Queens Boulevard
Bridge was saved.
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CASE HISTORY 4 – Expansion of the Long Island Expressway, New York:
“Redesign of Retaining Walls with “Giken” Tubular Pressed-in Steel Pipe Piles”

The Project

The expansion of the ever-congested Long Island Expressway
(LIE) over Cross Island Parkway (CIP) just outside
Manhattan, New York included numerous retaining walls and
several deep cuts for bridge expansions. The bid plans for this
conventional design/bid/build project contained complete
designs for both permanent retaining walls and temporary
excavation support systems.
The main specified retaining wall and support method
consisted of very deep, 1 m diameter drilled-in soldier
piles/lagging, complemented with tiebacks or bracing.
Unusually heavy (over 1000 kg/m), and very long (25 m)
H-beams with welded-on cover plates were specified. To
install such beams, deep drilling in granular soils below the
water table, would have been required
Soon after start of construction in the fall of 2000, serious
supply problems for the specified heavy beams ensued. It
became necessary to explore alternative systems for at least
three major structures: a 78 m long permanent retaining wall
SP-1 at maximum 8.5 m height; an excavation system to
support an 11 m deep cut for construction of the new westerly
abutment of the LIE bridge over CIP; and an excavation
system to support a 9 m deep cut for the reconstruction of the
abutments of Marathon Parkway Bridge over LIE.
The subsurface conditions at this site are characterized as
terminal moraine glacial deposits consisting of medium dense,
becoming very dense with depth, sands and gravel with
varying proportions of silt, frequent cobbles, and numerous
boulders. Groundwater is present just below the proposed
excavation levels.
The Change
For this case, a value engineering change proposal was
welcomed by the owner (New York State Department of
Transportation, NYSDOT.) As usual, the fast track schedule
of this major project and producing a new design during
construction became a challenge, requiring the full and
amicable cooperation of NYSDOT.
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Interestingly, the beginning of redesign and the value
engineering process for the LIE retaining walls coincided with
an international conference on deep foundations in New York
City on October 5 to 7, 2000. Agonizing over the strict
limitations imposed by NYSDOT not only on soil parameters,
but also on their requested design methodology based on
codes, the author felt compelled to openly express her
frustration with some of the attendees at that conference which
apparently included the Giken “Press-in Method”
representative. Thus, Giken responded to a request to provide
“not just video animation or colorful brochures, but good
technical literature”. Read and absorbed during that weekend,
a presentation of the concept of the innovative technology was
made to NYSDOT. In less than one week time following the
conference, the complete redesign of one of the deep
excavation support systems, in full cantilever, was submitted
as value engineering change proposal. The installation of the
permanent wall and the first phase of the two deep excavation
support systems were completed in early July 2001. The
second phase was completed in the spring of 2002. The Giken
Press-in pipe piles system, a first outside the Far East, not only
resolved the steel supply problem employing domestic
lightweight pipe piles, but also allowed the use of the valuable
soil-pile interaction design approach.

Design and Installation
The Giken “Press-in Method”, also known as the “Silent
Piler” (because it is virtually noiseless and vibration-free), is
described elsewhere (Bearss et al. 2002; ENR 2001; White et
al. 2000). It uses constant outside diameter (ranging from 800
mm to 1080 mm) open-ended steel pipe piles, which are
pressed into the ground with a powerful hydraulic push piler.
An initial “reaction stand” is required to install the first three
piles. Thereafter, the piler literally rides over and grasps three
piles, as it presses the next pile. (The reaction force to
hydraulically press a subsequent pile is derived from the
negative skin friction of previously installed piles.) The piles
are nearly contiguous with maximum separation of 180 mm.
This nominal gap is closed with welded-on Pipe-Tee (P-T)
interlocks, or with flat bars. The pile installation is guided by
laser beam resulting in remarkable small alignment deviation
of less than 3 mm (1/8").
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For this project, a constant 914 mm outside diameter openended steel pipe piles were pressed almost contiguously into
the ground with a powerful 260 metric tonne capacity
hydraulic push piler. The nominal gaps of 180 mm between
adjacent piles were closed with shop-welded P-T interlocks in
the case of the permanent wall, and with flat bars for the
temporary support, extending a nominal 1.5 m below the
excavation level. To aid in penetrating into the dense granular
soils, two built-in water jets with maximum 7,000 KN/m2

(1,000 psi) pressure per jet were used. The entire installation
process was virtually without vibration or noise. The laser
beam guided pile installation resulted in remarkable straight
alignment.

Photo 4.1. – Begin of Installation of Pile with Giken Piler

Photo 4.2. – Close up of Giken Piler with Pile

Results

analysis was performed with varying loading and subsurface
conditions. The total length and wall thickness of each pile
was selected based on maximum allowable deflection at the
pile head and allowable bending stresses in the pile itself.
Consistently, the results of the analysis indicated that a depth
of embedment for each pile about equal to the cantilever
height would provide an adequate performance. In general,
thin-wall pipe piles offered a better flexible performance
(Bedian 2002).

The 0.914 m outside diameter steel pipe piles possess
significant bending resistance to lateral loads and as such,
support in full cantilever of the deep cuts, was achieved — the
most desirable excavation support system for a contractor.
Deflection based methods for the analysis of piles under
lateral loads (Reese et al. 1974; API 1993; Reese et al. 2000;
Reese and Van Impe 2001), were employed and a parametric
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Photos 4.1 and 4.2 below show the Giken piler during
installation of the LIE retaining wall SP-1.
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Upon final excavation, measured movements at the pile heads
were remarkably close to the predicted values (based on
estimated p-y curves for the granular soils at this site.)

125 mm. Along the back of the new abutment where 17.5 mm
thick wall piles were pressed-in, the average measured pile
head movement was 161 mm.

Measured movements at the permanent wall were as per
design, less than 25 mm.

The total lateral pile head movements are inclusive of about
25 mm deflection experienced by each tubular pile
immediately following the driving of the new abutment pile
foundations (324 mm diameter steel pipe piles) at the bottom
of the cut. The additional movement was probably due to the
pile driving vibration-induced temporary loosening /
liquefaction of the submerged sands below the excavation,
upon removal of the 10.7 m overburden soils.

For the 10.7 m deep west abutment excavation where large
movements (150 mm to 180 mm) were allowed, the maximum
measured pile top movements were as follows (Fig. 4.1):
along the centerline of LIE where 25 mm thick wall tubular
piles were pressed-in, the maximum pile-head movement was
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Fig. 4.1. – Pile Lateral Deflection Diagram for the 10.7 m Cantilever Excavation
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below present the computed pile moment and mobilized soil reaction diagrams, respectively.
10.7m Cantilever; 21.3 Long; 0.914m OD;
Steel Pipe Piles Pressed-in with "GIKEN"

10.7m Cantilever; 21.3m Long; 0.914m OD;
Steel Pipe Piles Pressed-in with "Giken"

20

Computed for 25mm th.
Pipe Pile &Medium
Dense Sands [Max.
Stress in 25mm th.
Steel Pipe = 121.84
MPa (17.7 Ksi)

25

Fig. 4.2. – Computed Pile Moment Diagram
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Fig. 4.3. – Mobilized Soil Reaction below Excavation

Photo 4.3 below shows an impressive view of the completed retaining wall in full cantilever at 10.7 m (35 foot) height, with average
pile embedment of 10.7 m.
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